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Enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970,' the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act2
(commonly known by the appellation "RICO" or "The RICO Act")
was the end product of a lengthy legislative effort to develop new
legal remedies to deal with the problem of organized crime.' In re-
cent years, however, the statute has become the focus of contro-
versy as plaintiffs, compelled by the possibility of winning treble
damages and attorney's fees, have sought to apply the civil reme-
dies provision of the Act 4 to all types of cases, including those in-
volving what might be termed "garden variety" business fraud.
The civil damages provision of the RICO Act has been the
subject of much legal commentary. 5 Unfortunately, previous arti-
1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
84 Stat. 941 (Oct. 15, 1970).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
3. An excellent presentation of the legislative history of the RICO Act may
be found in Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009,
1014-21 (1980). As the Supreme Court recently stated, "RICO was an aggressive
initiative to supplement old remedies and develop new methods for fighting
crime." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3286 (1985).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
5. See, e.g., Pickholz, The Firestorm Over Civil RICO, 71 A.B.A. J., Mar.
1985, at 79 (1985); Weissman, Civil RICO, 20 TRIAL 54 (1984); Note, RICO and
Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1513 (1983); Tarlow,
RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291 (1983); Note, Civil RICO and Parens Patriae:
Lowering Litigation Barriers Through State Intervention, 24 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 429 (1982); Nathan, Doubling the Treble Damage Option: What An Anti-
trust Practitioner Needs to Know About RICO, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 327 (1983);
Fricano, Civil RICO: An Antitrust Plaintiff's Considerations, 52 ANTITRUST L.J.
361 (1983); Bridges, Private RICO Litigation Based upon "Fraud in the Sale of
300 [Vol. 7:299
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cles have generally provided the practitioner with little guidance
regarding some of the practical aspects of civil RICO litigation, i.e.,
how to determine when your client has a civil RICO claim, where
and when to file the action and, most importantly, how (and hope-
fully how not) to try a civil RICO case. The purpose of this article
is to set forth some approaches to these practical problems.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RICO ACT
A. Statutory Provisions
The RICO Act provides a potential treble damage remedy to
the practitioner who can fit his or her client's business fraud case
within its provisions. The civil damages provision of the RICO Act
provides as follows:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a vio-
lation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any ap-
propriate United States district-court and shall recover threefold
Securities", 18 GA. L. REV. 43 (1983); Wexler, Civil RICO Comes of Age: Some
Maturational Problems and Proposals for Reform, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 285
(1983); Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett
v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 237 (1982); Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and
Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101 (1982); Comment,
Civil RICO Actions in Commercial Litigation: Racketeer or Businessman?, 36 Sw.
L.J. 925 (1982); Comment, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations: Dis-
tinguishing the "Enterprise" Issues, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1343 (1982); Strafer, Mas-
sumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling," 19
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655 (1982); Comment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back
Into RICO: Sections 1962 and 1964(c), 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 100 (1981); Long, Treble
Damages for Violations of the Feleral Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis
and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201 (1981);
Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO):
Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980); Brad-
ley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV.
837 (1980); Note, The Enterprise Element in RICO: A Proposed Interpretation,
49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123 (1980); Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of
Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity," 124 U. PA. L. REV.
192 (1975); Note,'Enforcing Criminal Laws Through Civil Proceedings: Sec. 1964
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 53 TEx. L. REV. 1055 (1975). A num-
ber of additional articles are collected in RICO: Civil and Criminal (1984). Coun-
sel desiring a more thorough analysis of the RICO Act, its purposes and its legis-
lative history are urged to consult these sources. Counsel's attention is also
directed to the thorough bibliography of civil RICO decisions and commentary
offered in Milner, A Civil RICO Bibliography, 21 CAL. W.L.R. 409 (1985), and The
Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law (1985).
1985]
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the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee.
Because the term "person" is defined in the Act to mean "any in-
dividual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in
property,"'7 it is clear that a wide variety of individuals or entities
may maintain civil RICO actions in an appropriate case.
As noted above, the civil damages provision of the RICO Act
provides a treble damage remedy to any person who has been dam-
aged in his business or property "by reason of" a violation of §
1962 of the Act.' Section 1962 contains four subsections, each of
which proscribes different illegal behavior. Section 1962(a) of the,
Act provides that it is illegal to use income derived from a pattern
of racketeering activity to acquire an interest in an enterprise.'
Section 1962(b) of the Act states that it is illegal to acquire or
maintain an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity. 10 Under § 1962(c) of the Act, it is illegal to con-
duct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern
of racketeering activity." Finally, § 1962(d) proscribes conspiring
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1976).
8. As noted below, a number of federal district and circuit courts have fo-
cused upon the "by reason of" language contained in Section 1964(c) of the Act to
erect barriers to the maintenance of Civil RICO actions, such as requiring that
plaintiffs allege and prove that they have suffered a "racketeering enterprise in-
jury" or a "competitive injury." See infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
9. Section 1962(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... directly or indirectly, . to use
or invest . . .any part of [the monies or income from racketeering activ-
ity] in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
10. Section 1962(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976).
11. Section 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or for-
eign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering ac-
[Vol. 7:299
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to violate subsections (a), (b), or (c) of § 1962.12
B. Definitions
In § 1961 of the Act13 Congress provided definitions of the
terms used in §§ 1962 and 1964 of the Act; these definitions, as
fleshed out by the circuit and district courts, are as follows:
1. "Person"
It is unlawful for any "person" to carry out the activities pro-
scribed in subsections (a), (b), or (c) of § 1962. As noted above, the
Act defines the term "person" to include "any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.""
Because of the broad definition of the term "person" provided
by Congress, it would seem clear that the scope of civil RICO
should not be limited to any particular type of person, such as
"mobsters." In an attempt to limit the scope of civil RICO, how-
ever, some federal district courts have held that only those activi-
ties or persons with some connection to "organized crime" may be
the subject of civil RICO actions.15 The majority of courts, how-
ever, including every circuit court which has considered the ques-
tion, 6 have held that a nexus to organized crime is not necessary.17
tivity or collection of an unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). From the author's experience, this subsection of Sec-
tion 1962 is most frequently utilized by civil RICO plaintiffs.
12. Section 1962(d) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful to conspire to violate
any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section." 18 U.S.C. §
1962(d) (1976).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1976).
15. See, e.g., Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F. Supp. 632, 633 (D. Mass.
1984); Divco Constr. & Realty Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 575 F. Supp. 712, 714-15 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566
F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Wagner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 1982-83 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,032 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1982); City of Atlanta v. Ashland-
Warren, Inc., 1982-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 64,527 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 1982); Water-
man S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La. 1981);
Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 747 (N.D. InI. 1981); Noo-
nan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Barr v. WUI/TAS,
Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 112-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
16. Owl Construction Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540,
542 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Co.
Inc., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1974); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United
19851
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2. "Enterprise"
Under § 1962 of the Act, it is unlawful for a person to use
income received from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire
an interest in an "enterprise;" 18 to acquire or maintain an interest
in an "enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering activity; 9 or
to conduct or participate in the affairs of an "enterprise" through a
pattern of racketeering activity.20 The term "enterprise" is defined
in the Act to include "any individual, partnership, corporation, as-
sociation, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individu-
als associated in fact although not a legal entity."'2' Hence, as the
Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287 n.6 (7th Cir. 1983); Cenco, Inc. v. Seid-
man & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd en banc, 710
F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Bennett,
104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
17. State ex rel. Dep't of Human Services v. Children's Shelter, Inc., 604 F.
Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Okla. 1955); Roche v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 603 F. Supp. 1411,
1417 (M.D. Pa. 1984); Finn v. Davis, 602 F. Supp. 801, 805 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Mc-
Clendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1512-13 n.16 (D.N.J.
1985); Berg v. First American Bankshares, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 500, 504 (D.D.C.
1984); Ora Corp. v. Vinson, 596 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 n.1 (D.S.C. 1984); Lopez v.
Richards, 594 F. Supp. 488, 490-91 (S.D. Miss. 1984); Maxwell v. Southwest Na-
tional Bank, 593 F. Supp. 250, 255-56 (D. Kan. 1984); Joseph v. Algemene Bank
Nederland, N.V., 592 F. Supp. 141, 146 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Lopez v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 581, 589 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit,
586 F. Supp. 561, 568-69 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Morosani v. First National Bank of
Atlanta, 581 F. Supp. 945, 953-54 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Gerace v. Utica Veal Co., 580
F. Supp. 1465, 1468 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); Jensen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 1983-84 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 99,674 at 97,713 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1984); Swanson v. Wa-
bash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1318 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F.
Supp. 757, 761 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Kitchens v. U.S. Shelter Corp., [Current Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,838 at 90,202 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 1984).
Two federal district courts in North Carolina have held that the provisions of
civil RICO are not limited to those defendants who are in some way connected
with organized crime. See Gilbert v. Bagley, 1983-84 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $
99,483 at 96,794 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 1982); Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills,
Inc., Civil Action No. 81-1087-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 1984), afJ'd, 761 F.2d 162
(4th Cir. 1985); Hanover Trail, Inc. v. Jackson, Civil Action No. 82-10-CIV-5
(E.D.N.C. 1982).
An excellent discussion of the "organized crime" requirement and an impres-
sive list of citations was offered by Judge Giles in In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton
& Co. Securities Litigation, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1426-30 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
[Vol. 7:299
6
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol7/iss3/1
CIVIL RICO LITIGATION
Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Turkette,22 both le-
gitimate business entities and completely illegal organizations can
qualify as "enterprises" for RICO purposes.23
The courts have indicated that an enterprise is particularly
likely to be found where the enterprise alleged is a legal entity
rather than an "associational enterprise," and the courts have uni-
formly held that such entities are appropriately alleged as RICO
enterprises.24
22. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
23. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581-82.
24. See, e.g., Battlefield Builders, Inc. v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060, 1064 (4th
Cir. 1984) (joint real estate venture as enterprise); Alcorn County, Mississippi v.
U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th Cir. 1984) (association of
corporation and two employees as enterprise); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053,
1060-61 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd en banc, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied
sub nom. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Bennett, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983) (retirement
village properly named as enterprise); Lopez v. Richards, 594 F. Supp. 488, 491
(S.D. Miss. 1984) (association of corporation and individuals); Joseph v. Algemene
Bank Nederland, N.V., 592 F. Supp. 141, 146 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (corporations and
associations of individuals may constitute RICO enterprises); Umstead v. Durham
Hosiery Mills, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 342, 347 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (corporation, officers
and directors may be collectively deemed an enterprise); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565
F. Supp. 476, 496-97 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (brokerage business as enterprise); Gilbert v.
Bagley, 1983-84 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 99,483 at 96,795 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 17,
1982) (corporate management and corporation as enterprise).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an entity or individual
cannot be both the culpable "person" and the "enterprise" which is operated
through a pattern of racketeering activity. United States v. Computer Sciences
Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).
Although the Computer Sciences decision was criticized by Professor G. Robert
Blakey, the author of the RICO Act, see Blakey, The Civil RICO Fraud Action in
Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 237, 325 n.181
(1983) ("Computer Sciences was wrongly decided, and other courts should not
follow it"), it remains the law in the Fourth Circuit. See Umstead v. Durham
Hosiery Mills, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 1269, 1271-72 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Grantham &
Mann, Inc. v. American Safety Products, Inc., Civil Action No. C-83-126-D
(M.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 1984). A similar rule obtains in the Ninth Circuit, see Rae v.
Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit, see B.F. Hirsch
v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1984); Shared Diagnostic
Services Inc. v. Henningsen, 602 F. Supp. 428, 429-30 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Chambers
Development Co. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1541
(W.D. Pa. 1984), and the Seventh Circuit, see Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 400 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other
grounds 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985); Ideal Stencil Machine & Tape Co. v. Merchiori,
600 F. Supp. 185, 190 (S.D. Ill. 1985). This precedent may have a dramatic impact
on a civil RICO case if the corporate defendant is the only potential defendant
with the proverbial and desired "deep pocket."
1985]
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3. "Pattern of Racketeering Activity"
Section 1962(c) of the Act, which by the authors' experience is
the most frequently used subsection in civil RICO litigation, pro-
vides that it is unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with an enterprise to conduct the enterprise's affairs "through a
pattern of racketeering activity. 2 5 The term "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity" is defined in the Act to require "at least two acts of
racketeering activity," one of which occurred after October 15,
1970 (the effective date of the statute) and the last of which oc-
curred within ten years after the commission of a prior act of rack-
eteering activity."' The term "racketeering activity" is defined in
the Act to mean "any act which is indictable" under a laundry list
of federal statutes, including mail fraud, wire fraud, interstate
transportation of stolen property27 and "any offense" involving
"fraud in the sale of securities. '2 8
In most business fraud cases, the alleged predicate acts will
consist of mail fraud2' and wire fraud. 0 Under the federal statutes
On the other hand, in United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (11th Cir.
1982), reh'g. denied, 688 F.2d 852 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170
(1983), cert. denied sub. nom. Treasure Isle, Inc. v. U.S., 459 U.S. 1183 (1984), the
Eleventh Circuit held that a corporation may simultaneously be the RICO "enter-
prise" and the "person" who violates the Act. A solution to this dichotomy was
offered by the district court in Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Del.
1984), where it concluded that two corporate officers could violate § 1962(c) of the
Act by conducting the affairs of an enterprise (the corporation itself)- through a
pattern of racketeering activity and that the corporation could be liable for their
acts under Section 1962(c) on a theory of respondeat superior or agency. Id. at
1083.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1976).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1976).
29. The federal mail fraud statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudu-
lent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan,
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for
unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or
other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be
such counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security or other article,
• . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so
to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter,
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Ser-
vice, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or know-
[Vol. 7:299
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proscribing such conduct, the elements are (1) a scheme designed,
to defraud or to obtain money or property by false pretenses; and
(2) use of the mails or interstate wires (including interstate tele-
phone calls) in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. 3' The mail-
ing or the interstate wire communications must be for the purpose
of executing the scheme to defraud but it is not necessary that the
scheme contemplate the use of mails or wires as an essential ele-
ment.32 Under these statutes defendants must use the mails or
wires or cause those instrumentalities to be used; they need not,
however, be directly involved themselves in their actual use.3'
Moreover, these statutes do not require that the mailing or the
ingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or
at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom
it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
30. The federal wire fraud statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudu-
lent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be
transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in in-
terstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982). See, e.g., United States v. Blecker, 657
F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1982); Bennett v. E.F.
Hutton Co., 597 F. Supp. 1547, 1560 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Maxwell v. Southwest
National Bank, 593 F. Supp. 250, 257 (D. Kan. 1984); B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright
Refining Co., 577 F. Supp. 339, 347 (D.N.J. 1983), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 751 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984); Austin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 570 F. Supp. 667, 669 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
Because both §§ 1341 and 1343 outlaw the use of such facilities for the pur-
pose of executing the scheme or artifice to defraud, the courts have indicated that
the statutes are in pari materia and are to be given similar construction. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cusino, 694 F.2d 185, 187 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 932 (1983).
32. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954). A helpful overview of the
federal mail and wire fraud statutes may be found in Buckley, Corporate Crimi-
nal Liability: A Primer for Corporate Counsel, 40 Bus. LAW. 129, 149-50 (Nov.
1984).
33. United States v. Roemer, 703 F.2d 805, 806 n.1 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied,
707 F.2d 515 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 341 (1983); United States v. John-
son, 700 F.2d 163, 177 (5th Cir.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 718 F.2d 1317 (5th
Cir. 1983).
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wire communication be made directly to the victim of the
scheme. 4
Finally, it should be noted that for purposes of the RICO Act,
each act of criminal activity committed by defendants is counted
as an act of racketeering activity, even if numerous acts arose out
of the same criminal episode.3 5
Until recently, the courts had uniformly permitted civil RICO
plaintiffs to bring suit without requiring proof that defendants had
previously been convicted of the underlying predicate act of-
fenses.38 In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,3 7 a panel of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a prior criminal conviction is a
prerequisite to the maintenance of a civil RICO action. District
court decisions after Sedima were split on whether its reasoning is
persuasive,38 and the Supreme Court, reversing Sedima, held that
34. United States v. Johnson, 700 F.2d at 177. If, as part of their scheme to
defraud, defendants caused mailings to be sent to persons other than the plain-
tiffs in the civil RICO case, evidence of such other mailings should be admissible
at trial under the provisions of FED. R. EvID. 404(b):
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of an person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
See, e.g., United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Kovic, 684 F.2d 512, 515 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982).
35. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978)
(each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud counts as an act of racketeer-
ing activity); In re Action Industries Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 849 (E.D.
Va. 1983); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 217 (D. Colo. 1983); Harper v. New
Japan Securities Int'l, 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
36. Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287
(7th Cir. 1983); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1356-57 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); In re Longhorn Securities Litigation, 573 F. Supp.
255, 270 (W.D. Okla. 1983); State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Estate of
Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 675 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities,
Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Farmers Bank of Delaware v. Bell
Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978).
37. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 3275 (1985).
38. The Second Circuit's decision in Sedima was followed in Rooney Pace,
Inc. v. Reid, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,984 at 90,894
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1985); McCarthy v. Pacific Loan, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 137, 140
(D. Hawaii 1984); Gardner v. Surnamer, 599 F. Supp. 477, 479 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Bernstein v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel B.M., 598 F. Supp. 922, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Viola v. Bensalem Township, 601 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Berg v.
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a prior criminal conviction is not a necessity. 39
In a civil RICO action the plaintiff is required to plead and
prove the existence of both an "enterprise" and a "pattern of rack-
eteering activity.""
C. Available Remedies
1. Treble Damages and Attorney's Fees
As noted above, § 1964(c) of the RICO Act expressly provides
a treble damage remedy to any person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of § 1962 of the Act. Further, in
First American Bankshares, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 500, 505-06 (D.D.C. 1984); Terre
du Lac Ass'n v. Terre du Lac, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 257, 261 (E.D. Mo. 1984) and
Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dade Savings & Loan Ass'n, 592 F. Supp.
1089, 1093 (S.D. Fla. 1984). District court decisions in which Sedima was rejected
include Ross v. Omnibusch, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 835, 840-41 (W.D. Mich. 1984);
James v. Meinke, 606 F. Supp. 125, 127 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Witt v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 602 F. Supp. 867, 868-69 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Poling v. Mor-
gan, 598 F. Supp. 686, 690 (D. Ariz. 1984); Bennett v. E.F. Hutton Co., 597 F.
Supp. 1547, 1556-58 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Kitchens v. U.S. Shelter Corp., [Current
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,838 at 90,202 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 1984); Grado
v. Gross, 1984 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,660 at 99,336 (D. Mass. Aug. 20, 1984)
and Ora Corp. v. Vinson, 596 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (D.S.C. 1984).
39. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3281-84 (1985).
40. Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 495-96 (E.D. Pa. 1983). As the
Supreme Court observed in the criminal RICO context, "[tihe 'enterprise' is not
the 'pattern of racketeering activity;' it is an entity separate and apart from the
pattern of activity in which it engages. The existence of an enterprise at all times
remains a separate element which must be prove[n] . . . ." United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). See also Bennett v. E.F. Hutton Co, Inc., 597
F. Supp. 1547, 1559 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Mazza v. Kozel, 591 F. Supp. 432, 439
(N.D. Ohio 1984).
An example of how this requirement is interpreted is provided by Kimmel, a
civil RICO action brought by plaintiffs against various defendants, including a
brokerage firm, the alleged predicate acts being securities fraud. The court held
that the complaint, which alleged that the brokerage firm was the "enterprise"
and that the "pattern of racketeering activity" was an ongoing scheme of securi-
ties fraud perpetrated by the various individual defendants, all of whom were as-
sociated with the brokerage firm, sufficiently alleged the existence of a distinct
"enterprise." Judge Giles noted that "if the predicate acts of securities fraud were
eliminated, [the brokerage] still had an ongoing structure as a brokerage house
." Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 497.
In some cases, however, the courts have recognized that the proof used to
establish the pattern of racketeering activity may "coalesce" with the proof of-
fered to establish the enterprise element of RICO. See, e.g., United States v. Maz-
zei, 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
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addition to treble damages the injured person is entitled to recover
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."1
2. Equitable Relief
The federal courts are divided on the issue of whether a fed-
eral court may award equitable relief in the form of an injunction
in a civil RICO case. Section 1964(b) of the Act provides that the
Attorney General may institute RICO proceedings and that sub-
section also provides that a district court "may at any time enter
such restraining order and prohibition or take such other actions,
including the acceptance of satisfaction performance bonds, as it
shall deem proper."'42 In contrast, § 1964(c) of the Act, which
grants private parties a civil RICO action, is silent as to injunctive
relief.43 Because of this contrasting language, several courts have
opined that injunctive relief is not available to private claimants
under the RICO Act.44 The opposite view of § 1964(c), however,
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976). In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Liebowitz,
730 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit held that attorney's fees could not
be awarded to a party in a civil RICO action which had obtained a preliminary
injunction and then favorably settled the case. The court noted that the RICO
Act was patterned in part after the antitrust laws and that when RICO was en-
acted in 1970 it was well settled that attorney's fees could not be awarded in
antitrust actions in which injunctive relief was sought. It further noted that al-
though Congress subsequently chose to amend Section 4 of the Clayton Act to
include a fee-shifting provision it did not similarly amend Section 1964(c) of the
RICO Act. The court found that it was bound by the legislative intent that ex-
isted when RICO was enacted and would not speculate as to what the current
Congress would do. Id. at 909. In James v. Meinke, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 91,933 at 90,648 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 1984), a proceeding to set at-
torney's fees in a civil RICO case, the court, because of the highly complex nature
of such litigation, increased the hourly rate of plaintiff's counsel by a contingency
multiplier of two and further enhanced the fee award by a factor of 1.5. Id. at
90,649-50.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1976).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
44. Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 290 (4th Cir. 1983) (injunctive
relief probably not available to private plaintiffs); DeMent v. Abbott Capital
Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1378, 1382-84 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (injunctive relief not available);
Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987, 994 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (same). See
also Trane Co. v. O'Connor Securities, 718 F.2d 26, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1983) (provi-
sional relief available if likelihood of irreparable harm demonstrated, but the
court doubts the propriety of a private party receiving final injunctive relief under
the Act); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd en banc, 710
F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Bennett,
104 S. Ct. 527 (1983) ("we do not reach the difficult question whether, under such
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has been taken by several other courts."
3. Divestiture and Dissolution
If a violation of § 1962 of the RICO Act is found, defendants
may be divested of any interest which they hold in the enterprise. 46
Those businesses under the ownership or control of the defendants
may be enjoined from further business activity,47 including possi-
facts as may be developed in this case, this equitable relief is available to private
plaintiffs pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964 and, if not, whether such relief may be
granted under the court's general equitable powers").
45. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Liebowitz, 730 F.2d 905, 909 (2d
Cir. 1984) (availability of preliminary injunctive relief for private plaintiff not
questioned); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, 689 F.2d 94, 96 (6th Cir. 1982)
(provisional equitable relief permissible); Chambers Development Co. v. Brown-
ing-Ferris Industries, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1540-41 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (equitable
relief is available to private parties under RICO).
In a few civil RICO cases the federal courts have exercised their inherent
equitable powers and granted injunctive relief to a private claimant. See, e.g.,
Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993
(S.D. Tex. 1981). This view has also been advanced by several commentators. See
generally, J. Fricano, Civil RICO-An Antitrust Plaintiff's Considerations, 1
CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 827-28 (Prac. Law. Inst. 1983);
Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations: Basic Con-
cepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 1009, 1038 n.133 (1980). An
excellent discussion of both sides of this issue was recently offered by Judge
Sarokin in McClendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1518-19
(D.N.J. 1985) See also Note, The Availability of Equitable Relief in Civil Causes
of Action in RICO, 59 NOTRE DAME LAW. 945 (1984).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976 & Supp. 1983). This statutory provision states:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appro-
priate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest
himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing
reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any per-
son, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging
in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities
of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or
reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of
innocent persons.
See, e.g., United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1982).
In one civil RICO case where the authors represented plaintiffs and sought
divestiture and dissolution, however, they encountered strong judicial resistance
to the notion that the corporate "enterprise" should be dissolved.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976 & Supp. 1983). See, e.g., Aetna Casualty &
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ble dissolution or reorganization."
II. APPLICABILITY OF CIVIL RICO TO BUSINESS ORIENTED CASES
Because of its broad language and potentially broad applica-
bility, it is not surprising that practitioners have brought civil
RICO claims in a wide variety of cases. Among the areas of the law
in which civil RICO has been alleged are breaches of corporate fi-
duciary duty,4 9 commercial fraud,50 securities fraud, 51 real estate
Surety Co. v. Liebowitz, 730 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1984); Trane Co. V. O'Connor
Securities, 718 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1983); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy,
689 F.2d 94, 96 (6th Cir. 1982); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413,
418 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave, 540 F. Supp. 81, 85 (W.D.N.Y.
1981); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp.
993, 1014 (S.D. Tex 1981).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976 & Supp. 1983). See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 685
F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd en banc, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied sub nor. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Bennett, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983);
County of Cook v. Lynch, 560 F. Supp. 136, 139 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
49. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M., 598 F. Supp. 922
(E.D. Pa. 1984) (action by shareholders); Berg v. First American Bankshares, Inc.,
599 F. Supp. 500 (D.D.C. 1984) (corporate merger); Umstead v. Durham Hosiery
Mills, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 1269 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (minority shareholder squeeze-
out); Joseph v. Algemene Bank Nederland, N.V., 592 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Pa.
1984) (corporate merger); Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (tender offer).
50. See, e.g., Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747
F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985) (lending discrimination);
Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Industries, Inc., 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984)
(audit fraud); Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786
(3d Cir. 1984) (breach of contract); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. Inc., 741 F.2d
482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985) (import fraud); Bankers Trust Co.
v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984) (bankruptcy fraud); Alcorn County, Miss.
v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1984) (office supply con-
tract bidding fraud); Owl Construction Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727
F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984) (breach of construc-
tion contract); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272
(7th Cir. 1983) (false purchase order fraud); Poling v. Morgan, 598 F. Supp. 686
(D. Ariz. 1984) (fraud in sale of mobile home); Ora Corp. v. Vinson, 596 F. Supp.
1546 (D.S.C. 1984) (dispute between competitors); Maxwell v. Southwest Nat'l
Bank, 593 F. Supp. 250 (D. Kan. 1984) (action against bank for allegedly de-
frauding heirs and legatees out of estate); Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate
Bank of Oregon, 590 F. Supp. 445 (D. Or. 1984) (prime rate lending discrimina-
tion); Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162 (D.D.C. 1983) (executive employment
agency fraud); Morosani v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 581 F. Supp. 945
(N.D. Ga. 1984) (prime rate lending discrimination); Gerace v. Utica Veal Co., 580
F. Supp. 1465 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (slaughterhouse operation).
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fraud 52 and antitrust.13
A. Judicially-Imposed Limitations on Civil RICO Actions
Perhaps in response to these widespread attempts to apply the
civil damage provisions of the RICO Act to all types of business
fraud, a number of federal courts have attempted to erect barriers
to such actions. These barriers have taken the form of requiring
plaintiffs to plead and prove what has been termed a "racketeering
enterprise injury" or a "competitive injury."
1. "Racketeering Enterprise Injury"
As noted above, § 1964(c) of the Act requires a civil RICO
plaintiff's injuries to be "by reason of" a violation of § 1962 of the
Act in order to be compensable. 54 Relying on this statutory lan-
guage, a number of courts had reasoned that civil RICO plaintiffs
should be required to plead and prove that they have sustained a
"racketeering enterprise injury," that is, an injury beyond defen-
51. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied sub noma. Moss v. Newman, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984) (tender offer); Bennett
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 597 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (commodities fraud and
grand theft); Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (churning); Mazza v. Kozel, 591 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (joint ven-
ture); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (stock option
trading); Hulse v. Hale Farms Dev. Corp., 586 F. Supp. 120 (D. Conn. 1984) (lim-
ited partnerships); In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton & Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F.
Supp. 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (churning); Warner Communications, Inc. v. Murdoch,
581 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Del. 1984) (corporate takeover); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 581 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (churning); Eacho v. N.D. Resources, Inc.,
1983-84 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,690 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 1984) (gold and silver
investments); Jensen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 1983-84 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,674 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1984) (churning).
52. See, e.g., Battlefield Builders, Inc. v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir.
1984) (extortion); Lopez v. Richards, 594 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Miss. 1984) (land
purchase option fraud); Serig v. South Cook County Service Corp., 581 F. Supp.
575 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (joint development venture).
53. Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1528
(W.D. Pa. 1984) (attempt to monopolize); Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate
Bank of Oregon, 97 F.R.D. 440 (D. Or. 1983) (horizontal and vertical price-fixing);
Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256 (E.D.
La. 1981) (attempt to monopolize); Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable,
Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633 (D. Alaska 1982) (Robinson-Patman Act violations); City
of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 1981-82 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 64,527 (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 20, 1981) (same).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
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dant's predicate acts, in order to have standing to assert a claim
for damages. The courts requiring a "racketeering enterprise in-
jury" relied upon the theory that Congress could not have in-
tended to provide treble damage causes of action to persons whose
only injury stems directly from the predicate acts alone, and that it
is simply incomprehensible that a plaintiff suing under the securi-
ties laws would receive one-third the damages of a plaintiff suing
under RICO for the same injury. The courts which adopted this
standing requirement, however, did not present a clear definition
of exactly what it is, 56 and a number of courts refused to recognize
it because it cannot be defined.5 7 Other courts rejected this stand-
ing barrier because they find its imposition to be unsupported by
the language of the statute.5 8 The issue was resolved when the Su-
55. In an often-quoted remark, the court stated in Landmark Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D. Mich.
1981), that the civil RICO injury must be "something more or different than in-
jury from the predicate acts." See also Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 591
F. Supp. 581, 586-88 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Harper v. New Japan Securities Interna-
tional, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-08 (C.D. Cal. 1982). District court decisions
in which it was squarely held that a plaintiff must prove "something more" or a
"racketeering enterprise injury" were collected by the Seventh Circuit in Haroco,
Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 388 n.4 (7th
Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
56. Indeed, instead of defining a "racketeering enterprise injury" at least two
district courts have refused to do so, insisting only that they would know a "rack-
eteering enterprise injury" if they saw one and citing by analogy Justice Stewart's
now classic definition of pornography, see, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Willamette Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Blake &
Neal Finance Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 (D. Or. 1984); Waste Recovery Corp. v.
Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466, 1468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
57. See, e.g., Seville Industrial Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery
Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146, 1157 (D.N.J. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, both
on other grounds, 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1179
(1985); McClendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1512-16 (D.N.J.
1985); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1352-53 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Crocker
Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49-50 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Amer-
ican Nursing Care of Toledo, Inc. v. Leisure, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) T 91,978 at 90,870 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 1984). In Slattery v. Costello, 586 F.
Supp. 162, 166-67 (D.D.C. 1983), a particularly enlightening opinion, Judge Sirica
explored the many possible definitions of a "racketeering enterprise injury" and
effectively refuted each permutation.
58. See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd en
banc, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Bennett, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983) ("Insofar as the door of the federal courthouse is
similarly opened by RICO in a civil context, we are cautioned by the Supreme
Court that broad Congressional action would not be restricted by the courts in
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preme Court ruled in Sedima9 that standing to bring a civil RICO
action is not conditioned upon the showing that plaintiff has suf-
fered a "racketeering injury" separate from the injury caused by
the predicate acts."°
2. "Competitive Injury"
Similarly, several federal courts have used the "by reason of"
language of § 1964(c) of the Act to create another standing restric-
tion by requiring that a plaintiff plead and prove a "competitive"
or "commercial" injury. In order to interpret the phrase "by reason
of," these courts have looked to the antitrust laws and relied heav-
ily upon the Supreme Court's decision in the Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc. case." In Brunswick the Supreme Court
construed the statutory language "by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws"62 to mean that plaintiff must prove "anti-
the name of federalism. It is beyond our authority to restrict the reach of the
statute."); Butler Mfg. Co. v. Convey-All, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 1203, 1205 (N.D. Ala.
1985); Berg v. First American Bankshares, Inc., 599 F. Supp 500, 505 (D.D.C.
1984); Bennett v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 597 F. Supp. 1547, 1558 (N.D. Ohio 1984);
Ora Corp. v. Vinson, 596 F. Supp. 1546, 1549 (D.S.C. 1984); Joseph v. Algemene
Bank Nederland, N.V., 592 F. Supp. 141, 147 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Chambers Dev. Co.
v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1540 (W.D. Pa. 1984);
Hulse v. Hale Farms Development Corp., 586 F. Supp. 120, 121-22 (D. Conn.
1984) ("there is simply no basis for imposing a judicially-created standing require-
ment limiting recovery under § 1964(c) to businessmen, or those suffering from an
undefined 'racketeering enterprise' injury, since nothing in the statute or legisla-
tive history authorizes such a limitation.").
Counsel's attention is directed to the excellent analysis of the "racketeering
enterprise injury" requirement and the reasons why it should not be imposed of-
fered by Judge Mazzone in Econo-Car International, Inc. v. Agency Rent-a-Car,
Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1368, 1373-78 (D. Mass. 1984). See also In re Catanella and
E.F. Hutton & Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1434-37 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
59. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
60. Id. at 3284-87. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted the difficulty
which the lower courts had had defining and applying the concept of a "racketeer-
ing injury." Justice White commented that "[t]he evident difficulty in discerning
just what the racketeering injury requirement consists of would make it rather
hard to apply in practice or explain to a jury." Id. at 3285 n.12.
61. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
62. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1976), provides:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any dis-
trict court of the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
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trust injury." 3 Following by analogy the Brunswick Court's re-
quirement of antitrust injury and examining the legislative history
of the RICO Act, several district courts in civil RICO cases have
restricted the reach of the statute to those plaintiffs that have been
"competitively" injured by the pattern of racketeering activity. 4
Under the majority view, however, the imposition of such a
standing barrier is contrary to the purpose of the statute. These
courts reject the analogy to the antitrust laws and observe that by
relying on the antitrust statutes, the courts imposing the competi-
tive injury barrier have ignored RICO's overriding objective, which
is to strike "a mortal blow against the property interest of organ-
ized crime." 5 Further, while the purpose of the antitrust laws is
the promotion of competition, the RICO Act was designed to cause
the economic ruin of an enterprise which operates through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity.6 Accordingly, most courts consider-
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee .
63. The Brunswick Court stated that:
[For] plaintiffs to recover treble damages on account of § 7 violations,
they must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence
in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say in-
jury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that
flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury
should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of an-
ticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.
429 U.S. at 489 (original emphasis).
64. See, e.g., Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of California, 535 F.
Supp. 1125, 1135-37 (D. Mass. 1982); North Barington Development v. Fanslow,
547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Harper v. New Japan Securities Int'l Inc.,
545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-08 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Miller v. Affiliated Financial Corp.,
600 F. Supp. 987, 993-94 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Banowitz v. State Exchange Bank, 600
F. Supp. 1466, 1470 (N.D. Ill. 1985); O'Donnell v. Kusper, 602 F. Supp. 619, 622
(N.D. Ill. 1985); Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 91,963 at 90,805 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 11, 1985); Kitchens v. U.S. Shelter
Corp., [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,838 at 90,198 (D.S.C. Oct 26,
1984). See also Bridges, RICO Litigation Based on Fraud in the Sale of Securi-
ties, 18 GA. L. REv. 43, 69 (1983) (bond between RICO Act and antitrust remedies
is fundamental and broad).
65. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1357-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 509 (1983) (quoting 116 CONG. REc. 8602 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Hruska)).
66. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that the purpose of
the antitrust statutes is conceivably in direct conflict with that of the RICO Act
because "to ruin an antitrust defendant, usually a legitimate businessman, would
generally lessen competition and increase concentration in a particular industry."
Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd en banc, 710 F.2d 1361
(8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Bennett, 104 S. Ct.
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ing the question have rejected the imposition of a "competitive in-
jury" barrier.6 7
III. PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN CIVIL RICO CASES
Bringing a civil RICO claim involves a number of problems
which practitioners do not face in "ordinary" business or commer-
cial fraud cases. Among these problems is that of settlement; from
the authors' experience the effect of lodging a civil RICO claim is
to end, for all intents and purposes, any reasonable expectation of
settlement. 8 Moreover, civil RICO litigation imposes numerous
pleading and practice barriers as set forth below.
A. Pleading Civil RICO
Counsel drafting complaints in civil RICO actions in which
mail fraud, wire fraud and fraud in the sale of securities compose
the alleged predicate acts must be mindful of Rule 9(b), 9 which
requires that in all averments of fraud the circumstances constitut-
527 (1983). See also Econo-Car International, Inc. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc., 589
F. Supp. 1368, 1373-78 (D. Mass. 1984) ("RICO has the opposite purpose [from
the antitrust laws]. It is primarily designed to ruin those individuals and enter-
prises it is aimed at. It is not designed to increase their efficiency or protect them
from insolvency. Thus, the rationale behind the antitrust standing concerns have
no applicability here.") (emphasis in original).
67. See, e.g., Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d
1272, 1288 (7th Cir. 1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982),
aff'd en banc, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Prudential Insur-
ance Co. v. Bennett, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); Econo-Car International, Inc. v.
Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1368, 1373-78 (D. Mass. 1984) (setting
forth excellent and thorough refutation of the supposed analogy between the
RICO Act and the antitrust laws); Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162, 166
(D.D.C. 1983); Crocker National Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49
(N.D. Cal. 1982); In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton & Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp.
1388, 1431-34 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (collecting cases).
The requirement of a "competitive injury" was not before the Supreme Court
in Sedima, 105 S. Ct. 3275. While the district court had held that plaintiff's com-
plaint was defective because of its failure to allege either some sort of distinct
"racketeering injury" or a "competitive injury," Sedima, 574 F. Supp. 963, 965
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), the Second Circuit based its holding on the failure to allege a
"racketeering injury." Sedima, 741 F.2d 482, 494 (2d Cir. 1984).
68. While counsel representing plaintiffs in civil RICO cases may derive some
understandable pleasure from labeling defendants "racketeers," it is equally evi-
dent that many defendants will refuse to settle with plaintiffs who have brought
such a claim against them.
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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ing fraud "shall be stated with particularity." Courts applying Rule
9(b) in civil RICO cases have indicated that the complaint must
contain assertions regarding the "time, place and contents of false
representations" as well as the identity of the person making the
representation and what was obtained or given up thereby. 70
B. Civil RICO Statute of Limitations
Because the RICO Act does not contain a statute of limita-
tions, the limitations period to be applied in a civil RICO action is
that applicable to the most analogous state law cause of action. 71
Reference to North Carolina law reveals three statues of limita-
tions which might be deemed applicable to civil RICO actions: the
five-year limitations period in actions where fraud is alleged,72 the
three-year limitations period applicable to actions brought under
statutes,73 or the two-year limitations period provided in the North
70. Chambers Development Co. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., 590 F.
Supp. 1528, 1537 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 136 (E.D.
Pa. 1983). See also Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1062 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd en
banc, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Bennett, 104.S. Ct. 527 (1983); Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 591 F. Supp.
581, 585 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Sellers v. General Motors Corp., 590 F. Supp. 502, 505
(E.D. Pa. 1984); Hulse v. Hale Farms Dev. Co., 586 F. Supp. 120, 121-22 (D. Conn.
1984).
It is generally held that allegations pleaded "upon information and belief' do
not satisfy the particularity requirements of FED R. Civ. P. 9(b). 2A J. MOORE, W.
TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 9.03 (1984). The courts have
relaxed this rule, however, if the general allegations are accompanied by a state-
ment of facts upon which the claims are founded. Chambers Dev. Co. v. Brown-
ing-Ferris Industries, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1538 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Kimmel v.
Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The rule may also be relaxed as
to matters within the knowledge of the adverse party, although some courts have
required an accompanying statement of facts as well. Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F.
Supp. at 482.
71. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1062 (8th Cir. 1982), af/'d en banc, 710
F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Bennett,
104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 342,
347 (M.D.N.C. 1984).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(9) (Supp. 1984) provides that actions "[flor relief
on the ground of fraud" shall be brought within three years. The three-year limi-
tations period begins to run when the aggrieved party discovers the facts consti-
tuting the fraud or when, in the exercise of due diligence, such facts should have
been discovered. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 57 N.C. App. 680, 684, 292 S.E.2d 169,
171 (1982).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(2) (Supp. 1984), provides that actions based
"[u]pon a liability created by statute, either state or federal," shall be brought
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Carolina Securities Act.74 It is not clear, however, which limitations
period is applicable. In one RICO case where the predicate acts
were alleged to be violations of federal labor laws 75 the court ap-
plied the three-year limitations period for actions brought under
statute.76 In a second case from the same court,77 the issue was not
decided but the decision implies that either of the other two limi-
tations periods are applicable.78 In cases from other jurisdictions
the courts have taken varying approaches to the problem. 79
C. Venue in Civil RICO Actions
The RICO Act contains its own venue provision, which pro-
vides that:
Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any
person may be instituted in the district court of the United States
for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an
agent, or transacts his affairs.80
within three years. This statute of limitations has been applied to civil rights ac-
tions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See, e.g., Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083,
1092 (4th Cir. 1980). The limitations period begins to run from defendants' last
actionable act. Wilson v. Continental Group, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1, 2 (M.D.N.C.
1978).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(f) (1982) provides that "[njo person may sue
under this section more than two years after the sale or contract of sale of a
security."
75. Seawell v. Miller Brewing Co., 576 F. Supp. 424 (M.D.N.C. 1983).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(2). See supra note 73.
77. Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 342 (M.D.N.C.
1984).
78. Id. at 348. See also Gilbert v. Bagley, [1983-84 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 99,483 at 96,971 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 1982) (applying two-year
securities fraud statute).
79. See, e.g., Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, 755 F.2d
239, 249 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying New York's three-year statute for "an action to
recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute");
Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying analogous Califor-
nia statute); Creamer v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, 579 F. Supp. 1284,
1290 (D. Del. 1984) (three-year limitations period for actions involving civil con-
spiracy applied); Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234, 241 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (six-year limitations period for common law fraud actions); Eisenberg v.
Gagnon, 1983-84 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,475 at 96,739 (E.D. Pa. May 26,
1983) (same); D'Ivorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 232 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (same);
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 685 (N.D.
Ind. 1982) (same).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (1976).
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The first part of this four-part test ("any district in which such
person resides") is self-explanatory. The second clause ("any dis-
trict in which such person .. .is found") is fulfilled if the corpo-
rate defendant is present in the district by its officers and agents
carrying on the business of the entity.8' The meaning of the third
clause ("any district in which such person .. .has an agent") is
evident, while the fourth venue clause ("any district in which such
person . .. transacts his affairs") is derived from the antitrust
laws.82 A corporation will be deemed to have met this test if it car-
ries on business of "a substantial and continuous character" within
the district.8 3 It should be noted that venue as to each defendant
must be established in a civil RICO action."4
Where multiple defendants are involved and venue is inappro-
priate as to some of them in the forum district, that court may
order that other parties be brought before the court. Section 1965
(b) of the Act provides:
In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district
court of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of
justice require that other parties residing in any other district be
brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to be
summoned, and process for that purpose may be served in any
judicial district of the United States by the marshal thereof."
Additionally, the general venue provision8 has a supplemental
81. DeMoss v. First Artists Productions, Ltd., 571 F. Supp. 409, 411 (N.D.
Ohio 1983), appeal dismissed, 734 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984); Van Schaick v. Church
of Scientology of California, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1132 (D. Mass. 1982).
82. Bulk Oil USA, Inc. v. Sun Oil Trading Co., 584 F. Supp. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); DeMoss v. First Artists Productions Co., Ltd., 571 F. Supp. 409, 411 (N.D.
Ohio 1983), appeal dismissed, 734 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984). Section 12 of the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976), provides that any antitrust action brought against a
corporation "may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an in-
habitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business."
Id.
83. DeMoss v. First Artists Productions Co., Ltd., 571 F. Supp. 409, 411
(N.D. Ohio 1983), appeal dismissed, 734 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984); King v. Vesco,
342 F. Supp. 120, 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
84. Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 139 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (1976). See Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. American
Safety Products, Inc., Civil Action No. C-83-126-D (M.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 1984); Bern-
stein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1087 (D. Del. 1984).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976) provides in pertinent part that "a civil action
wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may . . .be
brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the
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application in civil RICO cases. 7 In other words, where venue is
improper under the provisions of § 1965(a) of the RICO Act,8" the
court should inquire whether the action can be maintained under
the general venue statute. 9
Applying the general venue statute, the court must usually de-
termine where the claim "arose" 9 by using what is termed a
"weight of contacts" analysis. Under this approach, the place
where a claim "arose" is ascertained by "advertence to events hav-
ing operative significance in the case" and a "common sense ap-
praisal of the implications of those events for accessibility to wit-
nesses and records." 91 Federal courts applying this analysis in civil
RICO cases have held that the claim "arose" where the predicate
act communications by defendants (i.e., mail and wire fraud)
originated.2
D. Service of Process
The RICO Act contains its own service of process provision93
which provides that "[a]ll other process " in any action or proceed-
ing under this chapter may be served on any person in any judicial
claim arose ... "
87. Ideal Stencil Machine & Tape Co. v. Merchiori, 600 F. Supp. 185, 190
(S.D. Ill. 1985); Clement v. Pehar, 575 F. Supp. 436, 443 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Lightner
v. Tremont Auto Auction, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1112, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976). See Clement v. Pehar, 575 F. Supp. 436, 443
(N.D. Ga. 1983). The demonstrated absence of a single forum wherein venue
would be proper as to all defendants is one factor which likely would cause a
court to utilize this provision. Soltex Corp. v. Fortex Industries, Inc., 590 F. Supp.
1453, 1459 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976).
91. Sharp Electronics Corp. v. Hayman Cash Register Co., 655 F.2d 1228,
1229 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See generally 15 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 3806 (1976 & Supp. 1984).
92. See Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. American Safety Products, Inc., Civil Ac-
tion No. C-83-126-D (M.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 1984) (venue would be properly laid in
Tennessee, from which defendants had mailed letters and instituted telephone
calls); Clement v. Pehar, 575 F. Supp. 436, 439-40 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (venue proper
in California, from which defendants had "by both telephone and mail, transmit-
ted false and misleading statements"); Medical Emergency Service Associates v.
Duplis, 558 F. Supp. 1312, 1314 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (venue properly laid in district
from which operative notices of contract termination had been mailed).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) (1976).
94. The "other" provision dealing with service of process is in 18 U.S.C. §
1965(b). See supra text accompanying note 85.
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district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or
transacts his affairs." This provision provides for nationwide ser-
vice of process, which is in turn governed by Rule 4(e). 5 The RICO
Act contains no provision stating the manner in which service may
be made, hence service is governed by the general provisions of
Rule 4.9
The propriety of process issuing from a federal court sitting in
a civil RICO case is not tested by the same constitutional limita-
tion as process issuing from state courts.9 7 In other words, the
state-oriented "minimum contacts" test stated by the Supreme
Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington" is not control-
ling. 9 Rather, where nationwide service of process is authorized
pursuant to a federal statute, due process requires only that a de-
fendant have minimum contacts with the United States. 00
E. Discovery
From the authors' experience, discovery in a civil RICO case
proceeds in a manner similar to that in any other case brought
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel defending
civil RICO cases, however, should educate themselves on the appli-
cation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion °10 in civil cases.102 Because information provided in discovery
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) provides:
Summons: Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within
State. Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court
thereunder provides for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an
order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found
within the state in which the district court is held, service may be made
under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute or
order, or, if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of ser-
vice, in a manner stated in this rule ....
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 4. See Grantham v. Mann, Inc. v. American Safety Prod-
ucts, Inc., Civil Action No. C-83-126-D (M.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 1984).
97. Hogue v. Milodon Engineering, Inc., 736 F.2d 989, 991 (4th Cir. 1984).
98. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
99. Fulk v. Bagley, 88 F.R.D. 153, 167 (M.D.N.C. 1980).
100. FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1981); Grantham
& Mann, Inc. v. American Safety Products, Inc., Civil Action No. C-83-126-D
(M.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 1984); Clement v. Pehar, 575 F. Supp. 436, 439 (N.D. Ga. 1983);
Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714, 717 (M.D.N.C. 1980).
101. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[no person ...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V (1982).
102. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination not only pro-
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in a civil RICO case could conceivably form the basis of a subse-
quent criminal prosecution for violation of the RICO Act or for
commission of the predicate offenses, defense counsel must give
careful consideration to their discovery responses. 03
IV. TRYING A CIVIL RICO CASE
As noted above, civil RICO litigation presents some unusual
problems in business and commercial litigation. Assuming that
counsel can survive the problems of pleading the predicate acts
and overcome the numerous motions which will inevitably be filed
by defendants, the trial of a civil RICO action can present the
greatest barrier to recovery."0 4
Courts addressing the issue have held that the plaintiff's bur-
den of proof in a civil RICO case is the same as in most civil
cases. 105 That is, the plaintiff is required to prove, by the greater
weight of the evidence (sometimes referred to as "the preponder-
ance of the evidence"), the existence of those facts which consti-
tute the predicate acts. As the court will instruct the jury, the
greater weight of the evidence does not refer to the quantity but
rather to the quality and convincing force of the evidence. The
jury, in order to find for the plaintiff, must be persuaded, consider-
tects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself
in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions
put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where
the answers might incriminate him in future proceedings. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v.
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S.
551, 557 (1956), reh. denied, 351 U.S. 944 (1956). An excellent discussion of the
operation of the fifth amendment privilege may be found in Project, White-Collar
Crime: Fifth Annual Survey of the Law, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 279, 559-77 (1984).
103. See generally O'Neill, Civil Discovery and the Fifth Amendment, 11
LITIGATION 32 (1985).
104. The authors have represented plaintiffs in two civil RICO actions tried
to a jury.
105. See, e.g., Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747
F.2d 384, 404-05 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985); Lindner v. Durham
Hosiery Mills, Inc., Civil Action No. 81-1087-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd, 761
F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 328 (D.N.J. 1984); Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131,
133-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F.
Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ind. 1982). See generally Matz, Determining the Standard
of Proof in Lawsuits Brought Under RICO, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 10, 1983, at 21.
In Sedima, the Supreme Court recognized that the legislative history of the
RICO Act supports this conclusion. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. at
3282-83 (1985).
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ing all of the evidence,: that the necessary facts are more likely
than not to exist.10 6
The principal practical problem in trying a civil RICO case to
a jury is that the action tends to take on a criminal patina. This is
so for several reasons not the least of which is the title and termi-
nology of the Act which denotes and connotes the most nefarious
type of criminal conduct. Moreover, the need to prove criminal vio-
lations (i.e., the predicate acts) simply serves to reinforce the crim-
inal aspects of such litigation. Additionally, defense counsel will, in
many instances, advance the notion that his client is a victim of a
criminal prosecution (or persecution).
The dynamic process likely to emerge from the pervasive
"criminality" of this civil proceeding is the jury's elevation, albeit
subliminal, of the plaintiff's burden of proof from "the greater
weight of the evidence" to "beyond a reasonable doubt." When
that happens, the case, unless it involves defendants who are per-
ceived as "criminals" or who have engaged in morally outrageous
conduct, is in deep trouble from the perspective of the plaintiff.
Civil RICO jury instructions are so long, convoluted, confusing and
complicated" 7 (and replete with references to criminal statutes/
conduct), that even the most clear and simple charge setting forth
the correct burden of proof is likely to go unheeded by the jury.
Furthermore, if the jury determines that the defendant has not vi-
olated civil RICO (i.e., is not a "racketeer"), the plaintiff's other
pendent claims are also endangered. Would a jury find unfair or
deceptive trade practices or a breach of fiduciary duty or fraud af-
ter concluding that there were no RICO violations? The odds are
palpably diminished.10 8
Overcoming the practical problems of trying a civil RICO case
to a jury begins with the selection of jurors. In a federal court, of
106. See 2 E. DEvirr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUC-
TIONS § 71.14 (3d ed. 1977).
107. See S. Buffone, Model Civil RICO Instructions, ABA SEC. LITIG. (1983).
108. In Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., Civil Action No. 81-1087-
CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1985), the jury found that
defendants were not liable for violations of the RICO Act or breach of fiduciary
duty. In another trial arising out of the same corporate reorganization and
merger, White v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., Civil Action No. 81-912-CIV-5
(E.D.N.C. 1983), aff'd per curiam, No. 83-2023 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2360 (1985), the jury found the same defendants guilty of two violations of Rule
lob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983), and common law fraud and awarded compen-
satory damages of $29,500 and punitive damages of $50,000.
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course, the judge will conduct the voir di4 of prospective jurors,
sometimes asking them certain questions posed by the attorneys
for the parties. To every extent possible, counsel for plaintiff
should be warned of the "businessman" juror, for whom the words
"business ethics" may be mutually exclusive terms. It is not too
farfetched to suggest that these "businessmen" are on occasion
somewhat lenient or tolerant of what passes for business "games-
manship." This "gamesmanship" may, in fact, be the pattern of
racketeering activity complained of. Hence, asking this type of ju-
ror to sit in judgment in a civil RICO trial is akin to requesting a
fox to review the propriety of another fox's gastronomic delight at
guarding the chicken coop.
Experience indicates that a jury comprised of women or mi-
norities may be more receptive to a plaintiff's case. Perhaps this is
because of the relatively pure point of view these jurors bring to
their fact finding duties. In any event, no jury will look favorably
upon a legitimate business dispute which ends up in litigation be-
ing transformed into a civil RICO case simply because plaintiff can
prove two predicate acts occurring within a ten year period. Not all
business cases are RICO actions, and to attempt to make them
RICO actions is professionally irresponsible. No one will grasp that
quicker than a conscientious juror. For these reasons, North Caro-
lina counsel who can do so are urged to also bring a pendent claim
for damages under the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices
Act."o9
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981) provides that "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce" are unlawful; the Act also offers a private
right of action to injured persons, including treble damages and attorney's fees.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1981). The North Carolina courts have held that the Act
is applicable in actions arising out of business transactions. See, e.g., ITCO Corp.
v. Michelin Tire Corp., 722 F.2d 42 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd on rehearing, 742 F.2d
170 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1191 (1985) (tire distributor determi-
nation); Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. American Safety Products, Inc., Civil Action
No. C-83-126-D (M.D.N.C. April 17, 1984) (breach of distribution contract); Hunt
v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 1981-82 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,210
(M.D.N.C.'June 24, 1981) (securities); Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980) (shopping center financing); Ellis v. Smith-
Broadhurst, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 180, 268 S.E.2d 271 (1980) (insurance agents' com-
mission dispute). In Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d 162 (4th Cir.
1985), however, the court recently held that § 75-1.1 is not applicable in securities
fraud cases, hence, this option is not available in civil RICO cases where the pred-
icated acts include "any offense" involving "fraud in the sale of securities," 18
U.S.C. § 1961(I)(D) (1982).
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Assuming that a meritorious civil RICO claim is to be tried
before a jury, plaintiff's counsel will need to make a studied deci-
sion regarding his or her trial style and strategy. While a
prosecutorial style and strategy may be appropriate in some cases,
it can carry with it the problem of converting, in the minds of the
jury, a civil proceeding into a criminal prosecution. On the other
hand, a non-prosecutorial style and strategy may suggest to the
jury that the case does not really involve a pattern of racketeering
activity. The nature of the racketeering activity at issue (marginal
to pervasive) should determine the style and strategy of the plain-
tiff's attorney during the course of the trial.
In a case of "marginal" racketeering activity, some considera-
tion should be given to the question of when is it prudent to dis-
miss the RICO claim in favor of advancing the other causes of ac-
tion (almost all civil RICO cases will probably warrant other
pendent claims). First, it is obviously improper to pursue a claim
which has insufficient evidence to support it. Secondly, to pursue a
civil RICO claim to a conclusion may harm the rest of plaintiff's
case. Attempting to transform a traditional business dispute into a
civil RICO case is not only professionally unacceptable but unpro-
ductive (and maybe counterproductive) as well. 110
The authors submit that a civil RICO claim should be dis-
missed as soon as it becomes obvious that the evidence necessary
to meet the burden of proof does not exist or is patently inade-
quate.11 Plaintiff's counsel should not wait to make this determi-
nation until the jury is enpanelled and listening to the evidence. In
the final analysis, the plaintiff in a RICO case has called the defen-
dant a racketeer and, in order to recover, the plaintiff must prove
this allegation. The jury will not, in all likelihood, take kindly to
the indiscriminate use of such a disparaging term which is pre-
cisely how it will be perceived if the RICO claim is dropped during
the trial. There is a premium on categorizing the type of action to
110. Under the Department of Justice's Guidelines for the Institution of
RICO Prosecutions, for example, the Government will not bring a criminal RICO
action where the predicate acts consist solely of state offenses or where the indict-
ment would be based upon a pattern of racketeering activity growing out of a
single criminal episode or transaction (Guideline Nos. 3 and 4).
111. Under the provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) or 41(a), court approval
must be obtained prior to voluntary dismissal of fewer than all claims in an ac-
tion. 5 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 41.06-1
(1984). See, e.g., Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. A.H. Robins Co., 61
F.R.D. 24, 28-29 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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be tried to the jury as soon as possible consistent with the develop-
ment of the evidence. If a plaintiff's lawyer is successful in getting
a traditional business case to the jury on a civil RICO claim he or
she will no doubt hear a version of the following closing argument
from opposing counsel:
Does my client, a simple businessman, look like a racketeer? Has
anything you have heard or seen during this trial reminded you of
the Godfather, or Al Capone, or Jimmy Hoffa? The Plaintiff has
not put on any evidence of illegal gambling, or prostitution, or
drug peddling, or anything like that. Yet, he calls my client a
racketeer and accuses him of engaging in racketeering activity. I
ask you, is this Defendant, a local businessman, a racketeer?
This type of argument, when accepted by the jurors, may well
inflame their passions against the plaintiff to such a degree that
they will reject the other pendent claims as well, even if they are
well founded and proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
While dismissing a RICO claim at any juncture may prompt a
scornful attack on the part of the defendant's lawyer, it is certainly
better litigation strategy to be rid of a weak or proofless claim as
soon as that status is ascertained. The plaintiff's attorney who ex-
pects that opposing counsel will constantly refer to the injustice of
having had his client called a racketeer in public only to have the
cause of action dismissed before trial, before he could vindicate
himself in court, might be well advised to consider filing an appro-
priate motion in limine to preclude such references during trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Civil damage actions brought under the RICO Act provide
plaintiff's counsel with a powerful weapon for use in business and
commercial litigation. The Supreme Court's recent endorsement of
a liberal reading of the Act in its Sedima' '2 and Haroco1l 3 deci-
sions will in all likelihood result in another flurry of civil RICO
case filings.1 1 4 Its utilization, however, presents complications
112. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
113. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Haroco, 105 S. Ct. 3291
(1985).
114. The recently published Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force,
ABA SECTION OF CORP. BANKING AND Bus. LAW (1985) reveals that of the 270 fed-
eral district court RICO decisions prior to 1985, only 3% (nine cases) were de-
cided throughout the entire decade of the 1970's; 2% were decided in 1980; 7%
were decided in 1981, 13% were decided in 1982; 33% were decided in 1983; and
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which will undoubtedly delay and render more difficult pleading
and pre-trial preparation. Because of these burdens and because
bringing a civil RICO claim might threaten the likelihood of the
jury returning a verdict for plaintiff, counsel must carefully weigh
the advantages and disadvantages thereby presented. The authors
submit that unless there is compelling evidence to support a civil
RICO case, it may be better trial strategy to go forward on the
other causes of action alone. Where there is such compelling evi-
dence, the case should be tried like a criminal prosecution. Be-
tween these two points, plaintiff's counsel Will have to draw his or
her own conclusions.
43% were decided in 1984. Id. at 55. It is clear, therefore, that civil RICO is a
recent phenomenon. This report also includes the following statistical breakdown
of civil RICO cases:
Securities Transactions: 40% of cases decided
Commercial or Business Fraud: 37%
Antitrust or Unfair Competition: 4%
Commercial Bribery: 4%
Labor-related: 2%
Other types of suits: 13%
Id. at 55-56.
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